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Over the last few years there has been a very marked 
increase in interest in energy issues and energy policy. The 
immediate cause was the success of OPEC (the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) in quadrupling crude oil 
prices in 1973 and 1974. This has had a profound effect on the 
state of the world economy and international relations, and has 
resulted in attempts by most countries to find alternative sources 
of energy. One other source, nuclear power, has itself generated 
further controversy, particularly in the light of accidents in a 
few countries. 
Scotland is no exception to this renewed interest in energy 
policy. Like all industrialised countries, we have suffered the 
deflationary effects of the huge rises in oil prices. However, we 
have the tremendous fortune of our own indigenous oil and gas 
resources in the North Sea, and thus have benefited from the oil 
price rises. The nuclear debate has been particularly keen in 
Scotland because of the electricity authorities' wish to build a 
new nuclear station at Torness in East Lothian, problems with 
an existing station at Hunterston in Ayrshire, the possibility of 
building a commercial fast breeder reactor at Dounreay in Caith-
ness, and the argument over mining for uranium in various 
parts of the country. 
It seems an opportune time therefore to examine energy 
needs and energy policy, and the purpose of this paper is to 
discuss the various options open to Scotland and the likely 
pattern of events over the next few years. 
Recent Experience 
Before discussing the future it is necessary to consider in 
some detail events over the past decade. The best starting point 
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is the pattern of demand, both in aggregate terms and from the 
point of view of individual fuels. In the current Scottish context 
five fuels can be distinguished usefully: coal, oil, natural gas, 
hydro-electricity and nuclear electricity. It may be that in future 
other energy sources - such as peat, solar energy, wind and 
wave power - may become important, but at the present time 
they make a tiny contribution. 
Table 1 shows energy consumption for each year since 
19701• The latest available figures are for 1977 but those for 1978 
and 1979, when published, are unlikely to show significant 
changes. The unit of measurement in the table is the petajoule, 
which is a measure of primary fuel input. There are alternative 
measures of fuel production and consumption - such as tons of 
coal equivalent or therms - but in the present context it does 
not matter which is used. There are also various different 
definitions of production and consumption - such as primary 
fuel input, heat supplied and useful heat - which are of more 
significance, but this aspect can also be ignored, although the 
related aspect of energy efficiency is discussed below2. 
Table 1 
SCOTTISH FUEL CONSUMPTION (IN PETAJOULES) 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Coal* 352.1 309.1 299.6 344.2 290.6 306.9 313.7 311.8 
Petroleum 381.8 400.7 424.0 448.4 424.9 375.7 376.1 382.6 
Natural gas 2.4 26.3 38.5 47.0 59.2 64.6 70.7 76.7 
Nuclear 
electricity 38.6 38.6 38.6 36.0 37.5 37.8 50.4 64.4 
Hydro-
electricity** 53.5 45.1 38.3 34.3 49.4 55.9 52.1 45.4 
Total 828.4 819.8 837.3 909.8 861.5 840.9 863.0 880.9 
* Including other solid fuels. 
** Including some imports of electricity. 
The table shows that over the seven years Scottish energy 
consumption has increased by 6.3%, equivalent to about 0.9% 
per year. There have been fluctuations in aggregate demand, 
however: consumption declined slightly in 1971 and more 
markedly in 1974 and 1975 but since then there appears to have 
been a reversion to the steady growth experienced in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Over the 20 years to 1970 the average annual rate 
of growth was just over 2%.  
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The fall in 1971 was a consequence of the industrial prob-
lems in that year and the 1973 and 1974 declines are an obvious 
consequence of the OPEC price rises. It is possible that the 1979 
price rises will have a similar short-term effect. It is interesting 
to note that energy consumption in 1977 was still less than the 
1973 figure. 
Of more importance, however, are the changes in the 
composition of demand. These can be seen from Table 1 and 
also from the % shares in Table 2. Four main trends are clear. 
Firstly, there is the sharp decline in coal consumption, both in 
absolute quantity and % share: consumption declined from 13.3 
million tons in 1970 to 11.3 in 1974, with a subsequent increase 
to 12.3 million in 1977; coal's % share fell from 42.5% in 1970 
to 33.7% in 1974 and although there was an increase in 1975 it 
has again been falling to its 1977 level of 35.4%. Twenty years 
ago coal provided more than three-quarters of our energy needs 
so the industry's decline has been very rapid. It is little con-
solation that there has been a similar decline in the rest of the 
UK and in most other Western European countries. 
Table 2 
PERCENTAGE SHARES OF TOTAL CONSUMPTION 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Coal 42.5 37.7 35.6 37.8 33.7 36.5 36.4 35.4 
Petroleum 46.1 48.9 50.6 49.3 49.3 44.7 43.6 43.4 
Natural gas 0.3 3.2 4.6 5.2 6.9 7.7 8.2 8.7 
Nuclear 
electricity 4.7 4.7 4.6 4.0 4.4 4.5 5.8 7.3 
Hydro-
electricity 6.5 5.5 4.6 3.8 5.7 6.7 6.0 5.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Secondly, there has been a contrasting rise in natural gas 
consumption. Since the replacement of manufactured town gas 
by North Sea gas, its share has risen sharply from less than 1% 
to 8. 7% in 1977 and later figures will certainly show a con-
tinuation of than trend. Most of the increase has been in the 
domestic sector. 
Thirdly, there has been the reversal in the growth record of 
the oil industry: in 1970 oil overtook coal as our major fuel but 
the OPEC price rises have checked the almost inexorable growth, 
and consumption has been static since 1975. 
Finally, there is the slow growth in the production of hydro 
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and nuclear electricity. Hydro's share has fluctuated between 
3.8% and 6.5% over the period; nuclear's production and o/o 
share were static in the early 1970s but the commissioning of 
the Hunterston B station brought increases in 1976 and 1977. 
This growth should be seen, however, in the context of official 
predictions of a tenfold increase in nuclear production during 
the 1970s and the continuing delays and problems of the nuclear 
industry are discussed in more detail below. 
These changes are all self-evident and need little further 
explanation. There is one point I would like to consider in more 
detail, however, because of its future importance and that is 
the relationship between economic growth and energy demand. 
Most energy authorities and government departments use the 
concept of an energy ·coefficient in forecasting demand. The 
energy coefficient is the ratio of the growth of demand for 
energy to the growth in GDP (gross domestic product) or some 
other similar measure of economic output. Given that the latter 
is much easier to forecast (or so most economists allege) it is a 
simple - and useful - means of obtaining a rough picture of 
energy growth. In the UK since the 1950s an average annual 
growth in GDP of about 2.7% has been associated with an 
annual growth of primary energy consumption of about 1. 7% -
giving a crude energy coefficient of about 0.7. There are some 
drawbacks in using such a coefficient for forecasting purposes, 
but they are not important in the present context. If we assume 
an annual rate of growth in Scottish GDP of around 3% over 
the next decade, total energy consumption would rise from its 
1977 level of 880.9 petajoules to around 1,040 in 1985 and 
1,155 in 1990. 
Is this energy coefficient and its implied relationship accept-
able? This is really the crucial question and its implications for 
the future are discussed in more detail below. In the context 
of what has happened since 1970 it is impossible to be dogmatic 
because there have been a lot of strange happenings. For 
example, industrial production in Scotland has increased by 
(only) 6.0% over the period 1970-77; despite the oil price rises 
energy consumption has risen by 6.3%. In the years when there 
were declines in industrial production (1971, 1974 and 1975) 
there were also declines in energy consumption and in the other 
years of increased industrial output there was increased energy 
consumption. Certainly for 1971, 1972 and 1973 there is a very 
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close correlation between industrial output and energy con-
sumption; but in 1974 industrial production fell by 2.0% and 
energy consumption by 5.8%; in 1976 industrial production 
increased by 0.6% and energy consumption by 2.7%; and in 
1977 industrial production increased by 0.4% and energy con-
sumption by 2.1 %. One possible explanation of the divergence 
in experience in 1976 and 1977 is that there has been a time-lag 
in operation, but we would need data for the period 1978-80 
before we could be reasonably certain of that. 
Some useful additional evidence is given in the paper by 
Hampson and Thomson3 where they disaggregate consumption 
by sector and show significantly different responses to the events 
of 1973 and 1974. In the domestic sector there was no significant 
decline whereas the drop in industrial consumption was almost 
double that in all other sectors. There was a small decline in the 
transport sector, with private motorists reducing petrol consump-
tion more than commercial road transport but still by not much. 
Given the ·importance of the industrial sector it should be 
remembered that the industrial recession itself was caused in 
part by the OPEC price rises so the disentangling of cause and 
effect is difficult. 
A crucial point to bear in mind at the outset is that the 
demand for energy is a derived demand. In other words, the 
primary demand is for appliances and energy-using goods and 
it is the stocks of these and their utilisation which determine the 
demand for energy. One implication of this is that in the short 
run the price elasticity of demand for energy - and, to a lesser 
extent, for individual fuels - is not very important because 
changes in the stocks of goods and appliances are very slow. An 
obvious example is the domestic heating sector, where the 
initial capital costs are substantially greater than the running 
costs and to change from oil to gas is not a short-term choice. 
Another example is the demand for petrol, which has fallen 
surprisingly little since the OPEC price rises, simply because 
petrol represents a relatively small part of the cost of motoring. 
The longer the time period, however, the easier it is to change 
the pattern of demand and it may well be that the real effects 
of the oil revolution will not be felt until the early 1980s. 
Forecasting Future Consumption 
Some rough estimates were given above: if an energy 
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coefficient of 0. 7 was used and Scottish GDP grew 3% per year, 
total energy consumption would increase from its 1977 level of 
881 petajoules to 1,040 in 1985. In million tons coal equivalent 
the rise would be from 31.7 in 1977 to about 37.5 in 1985. 
This provides a reasonable starting point and luckily more 
detailed forecasts have been made by the South of Scotland 
Electricity Board (SSEB)4. These are shown in Table 3 and are 
of particular interest because they represent the "official" picture 
based on existing UK policies. Two points should be made at 
the outset regarding these forecasts. Firstly, the SSEB are an 
interested party and it is in their interest that electricity's share 
of the energy market should continue to grow. Secondly, the 
SSEB have been strongly committed to a substantial nuclear 
power programme. They were the main proponents of the 
steam-generating heavy-water reactor (SGHWR) but have re-
cently accepted the Government's preference for an advanced 
gas-cooled reactor (AGR) programme. In May 1978 the Secre-
tary of State for Scotland announced that Torness would go 
ahead, but based on an AGR system rather than a SGHWR. 
Table 3 
SSEB FORECASTS OF ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
(million tons coal equivalent) 
1974 tons (o/o) 1980 tons (o/o) 1984 tons (%) 
Oil 12.0 (38.7) 14.0 (36.8) 15.0 (35.7) 
Coal 4.0 (12.9) 4.0 (10.5) 4.0 (9.5) 
Gas 2.0 (6.5) 3.0 (7.9) 4.0 (9.5) 
Electricity 13.0 (41.9) 17.0 (44.7) 19.0 (45.2) 
- of which oil 2.0 3.0 4.0 
-coal 7.0 8.0 8.0 
-hydro 2.0 2.0 2.0 
-nuclear 2.0 4.0 5.0 
TOTAL 31.0 38.0 42.0 
Total coal 11.0 (35.5) 12.0 (31.6) 12.0 (28.6) 
Total oil 14.0 (45.2) 17.0 (44.7) 19.0 (45.2) 
Total gas 2.0 (6.5) 3.0 (7.9) 4.0 (9.5) 
Total hydro 2.0 (6.5) 2.0 (5.3) 2.0 (4.8) 
Total nuclear 2.0 (6.5) 4.0 (10.5) 5.0 (11.9) 
Source: South of Scotland Electricity Board. 
Note: The figures here are not directly comparable with those in Table 1 
because of differing definitions. 
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With future policy there are two major issues: the total 
size of the energy market and the distribution of demand among 
the various competing fuels. Differences of opinion about the 
former have not been great and it has not been a major policy 
issue. Nevertheless, it would be sensible to repeat the doubts 
expressed tentatively above. 
Given the events of 1973-75 it would be unwise to predict 
with great confidence that energy consumption will continue to 
grow in line with the rate of economic growth. It may, but it 
may not. It certainly did in the 1950s and 1960s, but the 
experience of the 1970s is so confused that we shall have to wait 
for another two or three years before we know if the relationship 
is likely to continue. Thus, it is rather unfair of the SSEB's 
Director and General Manager, Donald Miller, to say, as he did 
recently5, that "What people are saying when they suggest that 
there will be no growth in electricity demand, is that there will 
be no economic growth and that they don't believe there is going 
to be increased standards of living." There is a valid point of 
view that energy growth may be less than the rate of economic 
growth - in other words that the old relationship has broken 
down. This is not my view - nor that of Mr Miller - but it 
may prove to be correct and certainly warrants careful considera-
tion. There is also the valid point of view that electricity's share 
may fall and this is discussed in the next section. 
In the light of this uncertainty, however, the sensible 
strategy is to be sufficiently flexible to cope for the maximum 
likely demand. Problems of overcapacity are much less than 
those of undercapacity and it is therefore much better to err on 
the side of optimism. 
The Roles of the Different Fuels 
This is the major policy issue and the one that has caused -
and undoubtedly will continue to cause - the greatest debate. 
Taking electricity first, it is arguable that UK energy policy is 
too committed to electricity generation and that Scotland has 
an even greater dependence. The expectation for the UK is that 
although electricity may have difficulties in the period to 1980 
the rate of growth over the period to 1990 should average between 
3% and 4% per year. Given the great uncertainty about energy 
demand and energy policy, and the obvious need to make 
decisions on the basis of an acceptable range of forecasts, this 
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view of the Department of Energy /SSEB could turn out to be 
correct. On the other hand, there is a good deal of evidence to 
suggest that it might be substantially awry and therefore it is 
necessary to examine the alternative case thoroughly. In the 
present context only a brief summary is possible but there 
appear to be four main points. 
Firstly, electricity consumption in the UK as a proportion 
of GNP is much higher than any other country in the world, 
including those more industrialised such as the USA and West 





















Secondly, the generation of electricity is a relatively in-
efficient way of producing energy, although for many consumers 
it has been a very convenient form. The important factor is the 
conversion of heat energy into mechanical energy. The level of 
efficiency depends upon the maximum and minimum tempera-
tures of the working fluid used, usually steam. These tem-
peratures are limited by engineering considerations and in 
practice the overall efficiency of even the most efficient power 
station is less than 35%. The average is about 30%. In practice, 
this means that only one-third of the heat energy latent in the 
primary fuel is released as electricity, with the rest of the heat 
being discharged to the environment, through the medium of 
cooling water, as waste heat. Also the further losses sustained 
in the transmission and distribution of electricity from power 
stations to consumers must be taken into account; in 1975, these 
losses amounted to approximately 10%; and the overall efficiency 
for the UK electricity industry was therefore around 27%. In 
contrast, the efficiency of other energy forms is usually substan-
tially higher. Given the recent rises in energy prices, and the 
country's balance-of-payments problems it is not surprising that 
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the Government is keen to increase the efficiency of energy 
use - as exemplified by the "Save Energy" campaign - and 
electricity must inevitably be the main target. 
Thirdly, changes in relative prices will strengthen the above 
trends. The official view is that electricity will steadily increase 
its penetration of the energy market, to the extent that by the 
year 2025 it would account for about 60% of total energy 
supply to consumers, but this appears to ignore the effect of 
increasing prices on demand. Experience since the early 1950s 
shows that even modest rises in relative prices have had a 
depressing effect on demand, bearing in mind the time-lags 
involved because energy is a derived demand, the primary 
demand being that for energy-consuming appliances. The recent 
large increases in electricity prices have rendered it uncompeti-
tive in many sectors in comparison with North Sea gas and this 
has given rise to a number of official complaints by the electricity 
industry. At least until the late 1980s gas should continue to be 
much more competitive for uses such as central heating. 
Fourthly, some economists have been arguing that the 
current problems affecting the electricity industry are not simply 
a short-run consequence of the industrial recession, OPEC price 
rises, etc., but are in line with a long-run trend which implies 
that the growth in demand for electricity will continue to slow 
down and possibly even fall in the forseeable futut:e. The basic 
argument is that in some markets a "saturation point" has been 
reached - for example, with many domestic appliances such 
as televisions, cookers, refrigerators, electric kettles, etc. The 
growth in electricity consumption since the 1950s correlates 
very closely with the growth in ownership of these domestic 
appliances. Now that most households have these appliances, 
the growth in demand for them must slow down and must 
therefore have an adverse effect on the demand for electricity, 
principally in the domestic market (already badly hit by 
the inroads made by natural gas into the central heating 
market). 
A great deal of detailed work would have to be done to 
test the appropriateness and validity of the four points above, 
and unfortunately time is not available to do this, but to us 
there does appear to be sufficient justification in each of the four 
points to suggest that the official Department of Energy /SSEB 
forecasts of electricity demand are too optimistic. 
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On present plans, the excess electricity capacity will worsen 
rather than improve over the next few years. In 1978 the SSEB 
had an installed capacity of 7,572 MW (megawatts) and the 
maximum demand was 4,228 MW. The average thermal efficiency 
of the conventional plant was 33%7. The NSHEB had an 
installed capacity of 2,109 MW and the peak demand (on the 
mainland system) was 1,576 MW. In addition the North Board 
also takes some electricity from the Atomic Energy Authority's 
prototype fast reactor at Dounreay8. Thus at the present time 
there is substantial excess capacity - about 45% - although 
both Boards probably need 25-30% spare capacity as a safety 
margin in case of plant breakdowns. The bad winters of 1977/78 
and 1978/79 caused particular problems in that respect for 
the North Board and the South Board has had problems with 
the Hunterston B nuclear station. 
This installed capacity of just under 9,600 MW (plus Doun-
reay) will increase in 1979 with the commissioning of the third 
unit at the Inverkip oil-fired station (680 MW) and in 1980 with 
the Peterhead oil/gas-fired station (1,320 MW). Approval has 
also been given for the Torness nuclear station (1,320 MW) for 
commissioning in the late 1980s and the North Board are keen to 
build a pump storage scheme (of up to 3,200 MW) at Craigroy-
ston on Loch Lomond. There are also tentative plans for a new 
coal-fired station in Fife and a third nuclear station at Hunter-
stan, and, on a smaller scale, the North Board are considering 
expansions in Shetland, Orkney and the Western Isles. 
Even if the SSEB's forecasts of electricity demand in Table 3 
proved correct, the implication is that this surplus or spare 
capacity will continue, even taking into account the phasing out 
of older, less efficient coal stations. There is little doubt that 
this argument will be a common one in the public inquiries and 
related discussions about the proposed new stations. 
Nevertheless, it is more a matter of timing than anything 
else because at some stage in the future the excess will disappear. 
Leaving aside the nuclear versus non-nuclear debate, a station at 
Torness will be needed in the near future: the SSEB say by the 
late 1980s, whereas the above figures suggest by the mid-1990s 
at the earliest. The cynics among us will probably say that this 
is therefore rather an unnecessary debate because our perform-
ance in building power stations is so bad that Torness will not 
be completed by the late 1980s in any case! 
... 
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The Craigroyston pump storage scheme is in a different 
category because of its nature as a "cheap reserve" for use 
only in terms of peak demand. Nuclear (or other) stations 
which have low running costs and pump storage schemes are 
sensible complements and the argument of excess capacity does 
not really apply to Craigroyston. 
The final point on electricity concerns the nuclear debate 
and this is not the place to discuss it. Suffice to say that there 
is increasing public concern about the dangers of nuclear stations 
- both conventional and fast breeder - and it is obvious that 
the Department of Energy and the electricity authorities will 
have to do a great deal to satisfy the majority of the public that 
an expansion of our nuclear capacity is safe. Only the nuclear 
enclave in Caithness seems to welcome uranium mining and/or 
a commercial fast breeder station and in the light of the in-
creasing sophistication of environmental groups the planning 
process will undoubtedly take a long time. 
In the short run, this would leave the choice for electricity 
of oil, gas and coal, and here again I have some doubts about 
existing policies. Oil and gas are attractive sources of fuel 
because of the North Sea discoveries, although oil-fired power 
stations would continue to depend on imported oil from the 
Middle East and other countries, but to the extent to which 
North Sea oil and gas are used for power generation and 
similar uses, my strong view is that it is a misallocation of 
resources. From the Scottish point of view, the main benefits 
from these new indigenous sources would come from the estab-
lishment of a major refining and petro-chemical industry. The 
main reason for this is that the type of oil discovered in the 
North Sea has a much higher proportion of the "lighter fractions" 
than oil from the Middle East, for example, and is therefore 
better used for petrochemicals than industrial fuel; also, there 
have been large discoveries of associated gas in the northern 
North Sea, and these similarly offer opportunities for processing. 
In fact, gas processing is likely to be on a much greater scale 
than oil refining and processing, although at the present time 
there are few signs of the opportunities being grasped, and it 
could well be that much of the oil and gas will be used for 
other purposes or exported, either to England or Wales or 
overseas9. It is rather ironic that Shell-Esso have been experienc-
ing planning problems in their attempts to build petrochemical 
p 
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plants in Fife as severe as the electricity boards in their attempts 
to build power stations at Torness and Craigroyston. 
With gas, there are some added considerations because of 
the current arguments within the energy industry that the price 
of gas is too low. The real price of energy is now what it was 
in 1951/52, with the exception of gas which in real terms has 
fallen steadily over the last twenty years. A consequence of this 
is the pressure for rapid depletion of the North Sea fields which 
is undesirable not only in its own right, but also because of the 
problems it creates for the coal and electricity industries. There 
is certainly a case for setting a higher selling price in order 
to allow gas to concentrate on two very important markets -
the premium domestic market and the petrochemical feedstock 
market. Another reason is that if, as seems likely, a transition 
from natural gas to synthetic natural gas is required in the 
foreseeable future, then the pricing of the natural material 
should increasingly take account of the long-run· cost of the 
substitute material. 
This then leaves coal with a more important role in the 
Scottish energy market. Coal consumption and production are 
currently running at around 11 million tons per year, of which 
8 million tons go to power stations in Scotland. It is difficult to 
believe other than that the non-power station use will continue 
to decline steadily in the future, and therefore the crucial issue 
is coal's use for electricity generation. Traditionally, Scottish 
coal has been high-cost, even within the UK industry: in the 
financial year 1974/75 the loss per ton to the National Coal 
Board of Scottish coal was £0.96, compared with £0.29 in 
Great Britain as a whole, presumably largely because produc-
tivity was lower in Scotland, 39.5 tons per man-shift compared 
with 45.0 tons in Great Britain. Rising oil prices have made 
coal much more competitive, however, and there is a strong 
economic case for re-examining the National Coal Board's plans 
for Scotland. On social grounds also, there is the usual argument 
that the real resource cost of coal is significantly lower than the 
market price because of the unemployment which would be 
created in the mining areas if closures took place, and this 
applies much more to Scotland than to England and Wales. To 
the economist this argument is not strong, but it should be borne 
in mind, particularly since the National Coal Board employ 
around 27,000 people in Scotland. 
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On the face of it, there appears to be a good case for some 
of the newer power stations to be coal-fired, which would allow 
the industry to maintain its sales to the SSEB at around 8 
million tons per year plus about 0.5 million tons of slurry. A 
long-term commitment to do this would make forward planning 
much easier, and encourage the commercial exploitation of new 
discoveries. 
The change in relative prices has given a similar boost to 
the prospects of alternative energy sources such as solar energy, 
wind and wave power, but it is very unlikely that these will 
make more than a minor contribution in the near future. At 
the local level there are some possibilities - such as district 
heating schemes - but otherwise the problems are much greater 
than the environmental lobby recognises and a great deal more 
planning is required. In the short run we have no alternative 
to the conventional fuels discussed above. 
Conclusions 
The two crucial questions which energy policy has to 
answer are: 
1. What is the likely pattern of aggregate demand over the 
next 10-15 years? 
2. What will be the role of the various fuels? 
It should be clear from the above that there can be different 
answers to these questions, which implies that the energy debate 
will continue in Scotland for some time to come. The Torness 
confrontations may recur at fairly regular intervals. 
I have tried to avoid the nuclear versus non-nuclear argu-
ment because it is outwith the scope of the present paper, but 
I have attempted to set out fairly the main arguments about the 
size and nature of the future energy market. 
There is considerable agreement on the first question above. 
It seems reasonable to assume for planning purposes that total 
energy demand will grow at between 2% and 2.5% per year. 
Although there was an absolute fall in consumption in 1974 
and 1975, Table 1 suggests that growth has started again and 
that these two years should be seen as a hiccup in a long-term 
trend rather than a major change. 
On the other hand there is considerable disagreement about 
the second question and this has been the crux of the arguments 
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in Scotland. In particular there is a body of opinion wishing to 
constrain the growth of nuclear electricity and to a lesser extent 
(and for different reasons) the domestic consumption of natural 
gas. The obverse of that is the encouragement of the Scottish 
coal industry and alternative energy sources. It is probably 
reasonable to conclude that an expansion of the coal industry is 
out of the question and that the best hope is to maintain 
production and consumption at roughly current levels. Many 
hopes for alternative sources are also over-optimistic at the 
national level. 
There can be little doubt, however, that the more open 
discussion of needs and policies has been very beneficial in 
recent years and that the non-official lobby is acquiring increasing 
knowledge and expertise. The result must be slower but better 
policy decisions. 
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